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Abstract
This paper investigates the linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) mean-field game (MFG)
for a class of stochastic delay systems. We consider a large population system in which
the dynamics of each player satisfies some forward stochastic differential delay equation
(SDDE). The consistency condition or Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) principle is estab-
lished through an auxiliary mean-field system of anticipated forward-backward stochastic
differential equation with delay (AFBSDDE). The wellposedness of such consistency condi-
tion system can be further established by some continuation method instead the classical
fixed-point analysis. Thus, the consistency condition maybe given on arbitrary time horizon.
The decentralized strategies are derived which are shown to satisfy the ǫ-Nash equilibrium
property. Two special cases of our MFG for delayed system are further investigated.
Key words: Anticipated forward-backward stochastic differential equation with delay (AF-
BSDDE), Continuation method, ǫ-Nash equilibrium, Mean-field game, Stochastic differential
equation with delay (SDDE).
1 Introduction
Recently, within the context of noncooperative game theory, the dynamic optimization of stochas-
tic large-population system has attracted consistent and intense research attentions through
a variety of fields including management science, engineering, mathematical finance and eco-
nomics, social science, etc. The most special feature of controlled large-population system lies
in the existence of considerable insignificant agents whose dynamics and (or) cost functionals are
coupled via the state-average across the whole population. To design low-complexity strategies,
one efficient methodology is the mean-field game (MFG) theory which enable us to obtain the
decentralized control based on the individual own state together with some off-line quantity. The
interested readers may refer [10,17] for the motivation and methodology, and [1, 4–6] for recent
progress in mean-field game theory. Besides, some other recent literature include [2,3,13–15,18]
for linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) mean-field games of large-population system.
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support partly by the Project B-Q34X and G-YL04.
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It is remarkable that all agents in above literature are comparably negligible in that they
are not able to affect the whole population in separable manner. By contrast, their impacts are
imposed in an unified manner through the population state-average. In this sense, all agents can
be viewed as negligible peers but they can generate some mass effects via some “unified manner”
such as the control (input)-average or state (output)-average. These averages represent some
type of impact imposed to other peers.
We point out in above works, all agents’ states are formulated by (forward) stochastic differ-
ential equations (SDEs) with the initial conditions as a priori. As a sequel, the agents’ objectives
are minimizations of cost functionals involving their terminal states. In some realistic situation,
there exist some phenomena in which the state behavior depends not only on the situation at
time t, but also on a finite lagged state at t− θ. Moreover, if we use the information which we
know to anticipate the future evolution, we can get better results. As the novelty, this paper
turns to consider the delay framework in which the agents’ dynamics is characterized by some
(forward) stochastic differential equations with delay (SDDEs). It means that the impacts are
hardly imposed to each agent immediately. A new type of BSDEs called anticipated BSDEs
(ABSDEs) was introduced in [20], which type of BSDEs can be applied to many fields such as
optimal control and finance. Based on it, the problems which depend not only the present but
also the history were solved by [7]. In the consequent works, the FBSDEs with delay and related
LQ problems were studied in [8] and [9]. A kind of stochastic maximum principle for optimal
control problems of delay systems involving continuous and impulse controls was considered
in [24]. The forward-backward linear quadratic stochastic optimal control problem with delay
was investigated in [11]. And the maximum principle for optimal control of fully coupled forward
stochastic differential delayed equations was derived in [12]. Moreover, some other important
phenomena with delay were under consideration in [25,26].
To formulate the above problem mathematically, some SDDE should be introduced to char-
acterize the dynamics of the agents. It is remarkable that there exist rich literature concerning
the theories and applications of SDDE. Generally, the large population problem with delay is
under consideration. We discuss the related mean-field LQG games and derive the decentralized
strategies. A stochastic process which relates to the delay term of control is introduced here
to be the approximation of the control-average process. An auxiliary mean-field SDDE and a
AFBSDDE system are considered and analyzed. Here, the AFBSDDE, which is composed by
a SDDE and a ABSDE. Further, the AFBSDDE can be divided into two simple AFBSDDEs.
In addition, the limit process is related to the wellposedness of a anticipated forward-backward
ordinary differential equation with delay (AFBODDE) and a AFBSDDE. We also derive the
ǫ-Nash equilibrium property of decentralized control strategy with ǫ = O(1/
√
N).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the large population
LQG games of forward systems with delay. In Section 3, we derive the limiting optimal controls
of the track systems and the consistency conditions. Section 4 is devoted to the related ǫ-Nash
equilibrium property. Section 5 gives two special cases in this work.
2 Problem formulation
(Ω,F , P ) is a complete probability space on which a standard (d+m×N)-dimensional Brownian
motion {W 0t ,W it , 1 ≤ i ≤ N}0≤t≤T is defined, in which a finite time horizon [0, T ] is considered
for fixed T > 0. FW 0t := σ{W 0s , 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, FW
i
t := σ{W is , 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, F it := σ{W 0s ,W is ; 0 ≤
2
s ≤ t}. Here, {FW 0t }0≤t≤T stands for the common information of all players; while {F it}0≤t≤T is
the individual information of ith player. Throughout this paper, Rn denotes the n-dimensional
Euclidean space, its usual norm | · | and the usual inner product 〈·, ·〉. For a given vector or
matrix M , M⊤ stands for its transpose.
Moreover, we denote the spaces of matrices as follows.
• Sd : the space of all d× d symmetric matrices.
• Sd+ : the subspace of all positive semi-definite matrices of Sd.
• Sˆd+ : the subspace of all positive definite matrices of Sd.
For any Euclidean space Rn, we introduce the following notations:
• L2F (0, T ;Rn) = {g : [0, T ] × Ω → Rn | g(·) is an Rn-valued Ft-progressively measurable
process such that ‖g‖2
L2
F
= E
∫ T
0
|g(t)|2dt <∞}.
• L2(0, T ;Rn) = {g : [0, T ] → Rn | g(·) is an Rn-valued deterministic function such that
‖g‖2
L2
=
∫ T
0
|g(t)|2dt <∞;}.
• L∞(0, T ;Rn) = {g : [0, T ]→ Rn | g(·) is an Rn-valued uniformly bounded function}.
• C(0, T ;Rn) = {g : [0, T ]→ Rn | g(·) is Rn-valued continuous function}.
In this paper, we consider a large population system with N individual agents, denoted by
{Ai}1≤i≤N . The dynamics of Ai satisfies the following controlled stochastic differential equation
with delay (SDDE):
dxit =
[
Atx
i
t + A˜tx
i
t−δ +Btu
i
t + B˜tu
i
t−θ +
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
B̂tu
j
t−θ
]
dt+ σtdW
i
t + σ
0
t dW
0
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
xi0 = a, x
i
t = ξ
i
t, t ∈ [−δ, 0), uit = ηit, t ∈ [−θ, 0),
(1)
where a is the initial state of Ai, xit−δ denotes the individual state delay, uit−θ denotes the
individual input or control delay. In addition, 1
N−1
∑N
j=1,j 6=i B̂tu
j
t−θ is introduced to denote the
input delay of all other agents, imposed on a given agent Ai. Similar state delay can be found
in [22]. Here, for simplicity, we assume all agents are statistically identical (homogeneous) in
that they share the same coefficients (A, A˜,B, B˜, B̂, σ, σ0) and deterministic initial state a. The
admissible control strategy ui ∈ Ui, where
Ui :=
{
ui
∣∣uit ∈ L2F it (0, T ;Rk)}, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Let u = (u1, · · · , uN ) denotes the set of strategies of all N agents; u−i = (u1, · · · , ui−1,
ui+1, · · · , uN ) the strategies set but excluding that of Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Considering the state
and control delay, the cost functional for Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N is given by
J i(uit, u−it ) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
[〈Rtxit, xit〉+ 〈R˜txit−δ , xit−δ〉+ 〈Ntuit, uit〉+ 〈N˜tuit−θ, uit−θ〉]dt
+
1
2
E〈MxiT , xiT 〉,
(2)
3
where R˜t = 0, t ∈ [T, T + δ], N˜t = 0, t ∈ [T, T + θ].
For the coefficients of (1) and (2), we set the following assumption:
(H1) At, A˜t ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn×n), Bt, B˜t, B̂t ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn×k), σt ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn×m), σ0t ∈ L2(0, T ;
R
n×d), a ∈ Rn;
(H2) Rt, R˜t ∈ L∞(0, T ;Sn), Nt, N˜t ∈ L∞(0, T ;Sk), and R(·) + R˜(· + δ) ∈ Sn+, for some δ > 0;
N(·) + N˜(·+ θ) ∈ Sˆn+ and the inverse (N(·) + N˜(·+ θ))−1 is also bounded for some θ > 0;
M ∈ Sn+.
Now, we formulate the large population dynamic optimization problem with delay.
Problem (LD). Find a control strategies set u¯ = (u¯1, · · · , u¯N ) which satisfies
J i(u¯it, u¯−it ) = inf
ui∈Ui
J i(uit, u¯−it ), 0 ≤ i ≤ N,
where u¯−i represents (u¯1, · · · , u¯i−1, u¯i+1, · · · , u¯N ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
3 The limiting optimal control and Nash certainty equivalence
(NCE) equation system
To study Problem (LD), an efficient approach is to discuss the associated mean-field games
by analyzing the asymptotic behavior when the agent number N tends to infinity. The key
ingredient in this approach is to specify some suitable representation of state-average limit.
With the help of such limit representation, we can figure out some auxiliary or tracking problem
parameterized by the state-average limit. Based on it, the decentralized strategies of individual
agents can thus be derived and we can also determine the state-average limit via some consistency
condition. Moreover, the approximate Nash equilibrium property can be verified.
Noting that the agents are homogeneous, thus the optimal controls of Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N are
conditionally independent with identical distribution. Suppose 1
N−1
∑N
j=1,j 6=i B̂tu
j
t−θ is approx-
imated by mθ0(t) ∈ FW
0
t−θ as N → +∞. Introducing the following auxiliary dynamics of the
players, dx
i
t =
[
Atx
i
t + A˜tx
i
t−δ +Btu
i
t + B˜tu
i
t−θ +m
θ
0(t)
]
dt+ σtdW
i
t + σ
0
t dW
0
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
xi0 = a, x
i
t = ξ
i
t , t ∈ [−δ, 0), uit = ηit, t ∈ [−θ, 0).
(3)
The associated limiting cost functional becomes
J i(uit) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
[〈Rtxit, xit〉+ 〈R˜txit−δ, xit−δ〉+ 〈Ntuit, uit〉+ 〈N˜tuit−θ, uit−θ〉]dt
+
1
2
E〈MxiT , xiT 〉.
(4)
Thus, we formulate the limiting LQG game with delay (LLD) as follows.
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Problem (LLD). To find an admissible control u¯i ∈ Ui for ith agent Ai satisfying
J i(u¯it) = inf
ui∈Ui
J i(uit). (5)
Such an admissible control u¯i is called an optimal control, and x¯i(·) = xiu¯(·) is called the
corresponding optimal trajectory.
We link the Problem (LLD) to a stochastic Hamiltonian system as follows, which is an
anticipated stochastic algebra differential equation system with delay,
0 = (Nt + N˜t+θ)u¯
i
t +B
⊤
t y¯
i
t + B˜
⊤
t+θE
F it [y¯it+θ],
dx¯it =
[
Atx¯
i
t + A˜tx¯
i
t−δ −Btu¯it − B˜tu¯it−θ +mθ0(t)
]
dt+ σtdW
i
t + σ
0
t dW
0
t ,
dy¯it = −
[
A⊤t y¯
i
t + A˜
⊤
t+δE
F it [y¯it+δ] + (Rt + R˜t+δ)x¯
i
t
]
dt+ z¯itdW
i
t + z¯
0
t dW
0
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
x¯i0 = a, x¯
i
t = ξ
i
t, t ∈ [−δ, 0), uit = ηit, t ∈ [−θ, 0),
y¯iT =Mx
i
T , y¯
i
t = 0, t ∈ (T, T + (δ ∨ θ)].
(6)
To get the optimal control of Problem (LLD), we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Let (H1)-(H2) hold. The sufficient and necessary condition for the optimal
control of Ai for (LLD) is that uit has the following form
u¯it = −(Nt + N˜t+θ)−1
(
B⊤t y¯
i
t + B˜
⊤
t+θE
F it [y¯it+θ]
)
. (7)
Moreover, for any given mθ0(t) ∈ L2FW0
t−θ
(−θ, T + (δ ∨ θ);Rn), the stochastic Hamiltonian system
(6) admits a unique solution (x¯it, u¯
i
t, y¯
i
t, z¯
i
t , z¯
0
t ) ∈ L2F it (−δ, T ;R
n)×Ui×L2F it (−θ, T +(δ∨ θ);R
n)×
L2F it
(0, T ;Rn×m)× L2F it (0, T ;R
n×d).
Proof The sufficient and necessary condition part could be from some variational calculus and
dual representation, which is a straightforward consequence of the stochastic maximum principle
in Yu [24]. We omit the proof.
Moreover, under assumption (H2), by the form of (7), our problem is to solve the following
fully-coupled AFBSDDE,
dx¯it =
[
Atx¯
i
t + A˜tx¯
i
t−δ −Bt(Nt + N˜t+θ)−1
(
B⊤t y¯
i
t + B˜
⊤
t+θE
F it [y¯it+θ]
)
− B˜t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1
(
B⊤t−θy¯
i
t−θ + B˜tE
F i
t−θ [y¯it]
)
+mθ0(t)
]
dt+ σtdW
i
t + σ
0
t dW
0
t ,
dy¯it = −
[
A⊤t y¯
i
t + A˜
⊤
t+δE
F it [y¯it+δ] + (Rt + R˜t+δ)x¯
i
t
]
dt+ z¯itdW
i
t + z¯
0
t dW
0
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
x¯i0 = a, x¯
i
t = ξ
i
t, t ∈ [−δ, 0),
y¯iT =Mx¯
i
T , y¯
i
t = 0, t ∈ (T, T + (δ ∨ θ)].
(8)
Applying the classic “continuation method” which was proposed in [16], [21], the proof is sim-
ilar as in the Appendix of [9], the above linear AFBSDDE (8) has a unique solution. So the
Hamiltonian system (6) admits a unique solution.
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For the further studying, consider the following two AFBSDDEs which are fully-coupled in
states, 
dxi,1t =
[
Atx
i,1
t + A˜tx
i,1
t−δ −Bt(Nt + N˜t+θ)−1
(
B⊤t y
i,1
t + B˜
⊤
t+θE
FWit [yi,1t+θ]
)
− B˜t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1
(
B⊤t−θy
i,1
t−θ + B˜
⊤
t E
FWi
t−θ [yi,1t ]
)]
dt+ σtdW
i
t ,
dyi,1t = −
[
A⊤t y
i,1
t + A˜
⊤
t+δE
FWit [yi,1t+δ] + (Rt + R˜t+δ)x
i,1
t
]
dt+ zitdW
i
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
xi,1
0
= ai,1, xi,1t = ξ
i,1
t , t ∈ [−δ, 0),
yi,1T =Mx
i,1
T , y
i,1
t = 0, t ∈ (T, T + (δ ∨ θ)],
(9)
and 
dx2t =
[
Atx
2
t + A˜tx
2
t−δ −Bt(Nt + N˜t+θ)−1
(
B⊤t y
2
t + B˜
⊤
t+θE
FW0t [y2t+θ]
)
− B˜t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1
(
B⊤t−θy
2
t−θ + B˜
⊤
t E
FW0
t−θ [y2t ]
)
+mθ0(t)
]
dt+ σ0t dW
0
t ,
dy2t = −
[
A⊤t y
2
t + A˜
⊤
t+δE
FW0t [y2t+δ] + (Rt + R˜t+δ)x
2
t
]
dt+ z0t dW
0
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
x20 = a
2, x2t = ξ
2
t , t ∈ [−δ, 0),
y2T =Mx
2
T , y
2
t = 0, t ∈ (T, T + (δ ∨ θ)],
(10)
where ai = ai,1+a2, ξit = ξ
i,1
t +ξ
2
t . It follows from the Appendix in [9] that (9) and (10) admit the
unique solutions (xi,1t , y
i,1
t , z
i
t) ∈ L2FWit (−δ, T ;R
n)×L2FWit (−θ, T+(δ∨θ);R
n)×L2FWit (0, T ;R
n×m)
and (x2t , y
2
t , z
0
t ) ∈ L2FW0t (−δ, T ;R
n) × L2FW0t (−θ, T + (δ ∨ θ);R
n) × L2FW0t (0, T ;R
n×d). Then we
have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 Let (H1)-(H2) hold, if (xi,1t , y
i,1
t , z
i
t) is the solution of (9) and (x
2
t , y
2
t , z
0
t ) is the
solution of (10), then (xi,1t + x
2
t , y
i,1
t + y
2
t , z
i
t , z
0
t ) is the solution of (8).
Proof It is easily to check that x¯it = x
i,1
t + x
2
t , y¯
i
t = y
i,1
t + y
2
t , z¯
i
t = z
i
t and z¯
0
t = z
0
t are the
solutions of AFBSDDE (8), then we can get the conclusion.
In the following part, we will point out the essence of the limiting stochastic process mθ0(t).
Firstly, we introduce the following AFBODDE and AFBSDDE,
d[Ex1t ] =
[
At[Ex
1
t ] + A˜t[Ex
1
t−δ]−Bt(Nt + N˜t+θ)−1
(
B⊤t [Ey
1
t ] + B˜
⊤
t+θ[Ey
1
t+θ]
)
− B˜t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1
(
B⊤t−θ[Ey
1
t−θ] + B˜
⊤
t [Ey
1
t ]
)]
dt,
d[Ey1t ] = −
[
A⊤t [Ey
1
t ] + A˜
⊤
t+δ[Ey
1
t+δ] + (Rt + R˜t+δ)[Ex
1
t ]
]
dt, t ∈ [0, T ],
Ex10 = a
1, Ex1t = Eξ
1
t , t ∈ [−δ, 0),
Ey1T =M [Ex
1
T ], Ey
1
t = 0, t ∈ (T, T + (δ ∨ θ)],
(11)
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and 
dx2t =
[
Atx
2
t + A˜tx
2
t−δ −Bt(Nt + N˜t+θ)−1
(
B⊤t y
2
t + B˜
⊤
t+θE
FW0t [y2t+θ]
)
− (B˜t + B̂t)(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1
(
B⊤t−θy
2
t−θ + B˜
⊤
t E
FW0
t−θ [y2t ]
)
− B̂t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1
(
B⊤t−θ[Ey
1
t−θ] + B˜
⊤
t [Ey
1
t ]
)]
dt+ σ0t dW
0
t ,
dy2t = −
[
A⊤t y
2
t + A˜
⊤
t+δE
FW0t [y2t+δ] + (Rt + R˜t+δ)x
2
t
]
dt+ z0t dW
0
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
x20 = a
2, x2t = ξ
2
t , t ∈ [−δ, 0),
y2T =Mx
2
T , y
2
t = 0, t ∈ (T, T + (δ ∨ θ)].
(12)
Proposition 3.1 mθ0(t) is in L
2
FW0t
(−θ, T + (δ ∨ θ);Rn) and it is of the following form,
mθ0(t) = −B̂t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1
[
B⊤t−θ[Ey
1
t−θ] + B˜
⊤
t [Ey
1
t ]
]
− B̂t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1
[
B⊤t−θy
2
t−θ + B˜
⊤
t E
FW0
t−θ [y2t ]
]
,
where y1t is the solution of (11) and y
2
t is the solution of (12)
Proof It follows from (9) and (10) that yj,1t is independent of W
0
t , y
2
t is independent of W
j
t , for
1 ≤ j ≤ N , respectively. Thus, we have
E
Fj
t−θ [yj,1t ] = E
FWj
t−θ [yj,1t ], E
Fj
t−θ [y2t ] = E
FW0
t−θ [y2t ]. (13)
By virtue of Lemma 3.1, we obtain
mθ0(t) = lim
N→∞
B̂t
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
u¯jt−θ
= −B̂t lim
N→∞
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1(B⊤t−θ y¯
j
t−θ + B˜
⊤
t E
Fj
t−θ [y¯jt ])
= −B̂t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1 lim
N→∞
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(B⊤t−θ(y
j,1
t−θ + y
2
t−θ) + B˜
⊤
t E
Fj
t−θ [(yj,1t + y
2
t )])
= −B̂t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1
[
lim
N→∞
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(B⊤t−θy
j,1
t−θ + B˜
⊤
t E
FWj
t−θ [yj,1t ])
+ lim
N→∞
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(B⊤t−θy
2
t−θ + B˜
⊤
t E
FW0
t−θ [y2t ])
]
= −B̂t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1
[
B⊤t−θ[Ey
j,1
t−θ] + B˜
⊤
t [Ey
j,1
t ]
]
− B̂t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1
[
B⊤t−θy
2
t−θ + B˜
⊤
t E
FW0
t−θ [y2t ]
]
:= Σθ1(t) + Σ
θ
2(t).
(14)
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Here, Σθ1(t) = −B̂t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1
[
B⊤t−θ[Ey
j,1
t−θ] + B˜
⊤
t [Ey
j,1
t ]
]
, which is the deterministic function;
Σθ2(t) = −B̂t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1
[
B⊤t−θy
2
t−θ + B˜
⊤
t E
FW0
t−θ [y2t ]
]
is in L2FW0t
(−θ, T + (δ ∨ θ);Rn). For
Eyi,1t = Ey
j,1
t , for i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, · · · , N , so Eyi,1t is independent on i, then we denote
Eyi,1t = Ey
1
t , where y
1
t is the solution of (11). Thus Σ
θ
1(t) can be rewritten as
Σθ1(t) = −B̂t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1
[
B⊤t−θ[Ey
1
t−θ] + B˜
⊤
t [Ey
1
t ]
]
.
Hence the result.
Remark 3.1 In what follows (11)-(12) are called the Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) equation
system which can be used to determine the control state-average limit m0(t). Note that m0(t)
plays an important role due to the dependence of decentralized strategy u¯i(t) on it. We can see
that u¯it in (7) is dependent on the solution y¯
i
t and y¯
i
t+θ of (6), and y¯
i
t, y¯
i
t+θ are dependent on
m0(t).
4 ǫ-Nash equilibrium analysis
In above sections, we obtained the optimal control u¯it, 1 ≤ i ≤ N of Problem (LLD) through the
consistency condition system. Now, we turn to verify the ǫ-Nash equilibrium of Problem (LD).
To start, we first present the definition of ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Definition 4.1 A set of controls uit ∈ Ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, for N agents is called to satisfy an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium with respect to the costs J i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, if there exists ǫ ≥ 0 such that for any fixed
1 ≤ i ≤ N , we have
J i(u¯it, u¯
−i
t ) ≤ J i(uit, u¯−it ) + ǫ, (15)
when any alternative control ui ∈ Ui is applied by Ai.
Remark 4.1 If ǫ = 0, then Definition 4.1 is reduced to the usual Nash equilibrium.
Now, we state the main result of this paper and its proof will be given later.
Theorem 4.1 Under (H1)-(H2), (u¯1t , u¯
2
t , · · · , u¯Nt ) satisfies the ǫ-Nash equilibrium of (LD).
Here, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N, u¯it is given by (7).
The proof of Theorem 4.1 needs several lemmas which are presented later. Denoting xˇit is the
centralized state trajectory with respect to u¯it; xˆ
i
t is the decentralized one with respect to u¯
i
t.
The cost functionals for (LD) and (LLD) are denoted by J i(u¯it, u¯−it ) and J i(u¯it), respectively.
Lemma 4.1
sup
1≤i≤N
 sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣ 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
B̂tu¯
j
t−θ −mθ0(t)
∣∣∣2
 = O( 1
N
)
, (16)
where u¯jt is given by (7).
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Proof. By (7), (13) and Lemma 3.1, we get
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
B̂tu¯
j
t−θ =
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
B̂t
{
− (Nt−θ + N˜t)−1
(
B⊤t−θy¯
j
t−θ + B˜
⊤
t E
Fj
t−θ [y¯jt ]
)}
= −B̂t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1
{
B⊤t−θ
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
yj,1t−θ + y
2
t−θ
)
+ B˜⊤t
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E
FWj
t−θ [yj,1t ] + E
FW0
t−θ [y2t ]
)}
.
(17)
Combining (17) and (14), we obtain
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
B̂tu¯
j
t−θ −mθ0(t)
=− B̂t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1
{
B⊤t−θ
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
yj,1t−θ − Ey1t−θ
)
+ B˜⊤t
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E
FWj
t−θ [yj,1t ]− Ey1t
)}
.
(18)
Then it follows from (H1) that
E
∣∣∣ 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
B̂tu¯
j
t−θ −mθ0(t)
∣∣∣2
≤C1
{
E
∣∣∣ 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
yj,1t−θ − Ey1t−θ
∣∣∣2 + E∣∣∣ 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E
FWj
t−θ [yj,1t ]− Ey1t
∣∣∣2},
where C1 is a positive constant. Recall (9) that y
j,1
t ∈ L2FWjt (−θ, T + (δ ∨ θ);R
n). Thus yj,1t is
independent of yk,1t , for j 6= k, and we have
E
(
yj,1t−θ − Ey1t−θ
)(
yk,1t−θ − Ey1t−θ
)
= 0
and
E
(
E
FWj
t−θ [yj,1t ]− Ey1t
)(
E
FWk
t−θ [yk,1t ]− Ey1t
)
= 0.
Hence the result. 
Lemma 4.2
sup
1≤i≤N
[
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣xˇit − xˆit∣∣2
]
= O
( 1
N
)
, (19)
sup
1≤i≤N
[
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣xˇit−δ − xˆit−δ∣∣2
]
= O
( 1
N
)
. (20)
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Proof. For ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ N , by (1) and (3), we have
d(xˇit − xˆit) =
[
At(xˇ
i
t − xˆit) + A˜t(xˇit−δ − xˆit−δ) +
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
B̂tu¯
j
t−θ −mθ0(t)
]
dt, t ∈ [0, T ],
xˇi0 − xˆi0 = 0, xˇit − xˆit = 0, t ∈ [−δ, 0).
Taking integral from 0 to T , we get
xˇit − xˆit =
∫ T
0
[
As(xˇ
i
s − xˆis) + A˜s(xˇis−δ − xˆis−δ) +
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
B̂su¯
j
s−θ −mθ0(t)
]
ds.
Note that ∫ T
0
A˜s(xˇ
i
s−δ − xˆis−δ)ds =
∫ T−δ
−δ
A˜s+δ(xˇ
i
s − xˆis)ds =
∫ T−δ
0
A˜s+δ(xˇ
i
s − xˆis)ds.
By Lemma 4.1, (H1) and Gronwall’s inequality, (19) is obtained.
In addition,
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣xˇit−δ − xˆit−δ∣∣2 = sup
0≤τ≤T−δ
E
∣∣xˇiτ − xˆiτ ∣∣2 ≤ sup
0≤τ≤T
E
∣∣xˇiτ − xˆiτ ∣∣2.
Then we get (20). 
Lemma 4.3
sup
1≤i≤N
[
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣|xˇit|2 − |xˆit|2∣∣∣
]
= O
( 1√
N
)
, (21)
sup
1≤i≤N
[
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣|xˇit−δ |2 − |xˆit−δ|2∣∣∣
]
= O
( 1√
N
)
, (22)∣∣∣J i(u¯it, u¯−it )− J i(u¯it)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (23)
Proof. For ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ N, it is easy to see sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣xˆit∣∣2 < +∞, sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣xˆit−δ∣∣2 < +∞. Applying
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and (19), we have
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣|xˇit|2 − |xˆit|2∣∣
≤ sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣xˇit − xˆit∣∣2 + 2( sup
0≤t≤T
E|xˆit|2
) 1
2
(
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣xˇit − xˆit∣∣2) 12
=O
( 1√
N
)
.
Similarly, (22) is obtained. Then noting (H2), we have∣∣J i(u¯it, u¯−it )− J i(u¯it)∣∣
≤C2E
∫ T
0
(∣∣|xˇit|2 − |xˆit|2∣∣+ ∣∣|xˇit−δ|2 − |xˆit−δ |2∣∣)dt+ C2E∣∣|xˇiT |2 − |xˆiT |2∣∣
=O
( 1√
N
)
,
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which implies (23). Here, C2 is a positive constant. 
Until now, we have addressed some estimates of states and costs corresponding to control u¯it,
1 ≤ i ≤ N . Next we will focus on the ǫ-Nash equilibrium for (LD). For any fixed i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
consider a alternative control uit ∈ Ui for Ai and introduce the dynamics
dlit =
[
Atl
i
t + A˜tl
i
t−δ +Btu
i
t + B˜tu
i
t−θ +
1
N − 1
N∑
κ=1,κ 6=i
B̂tu¯
κ
t−θ
]
dt+ σtdW
i
t + σ
0
t dW
0
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
li0 = a, l
i
t = ξ
i
t, t ∈ [−δ, 0), uit = ηit, t ∈ [−θ, 0),
(24)
whereas other players keep the control u¯jt , 1 ≤ j ≤ N, j 6= i i.e.,
dljt =
[
Atl
j
t + A˜tl
j
t−δ +Btu¯
j
t + B˜tu¯
j
t−θ +
1
N − 1 B̂t
( N∑
κ=1,κ 6=i,j
u¯κt−θ + u
i
t−θ
)]
dt+ σtdW
j
t + σ
0
t dW
0
t ,
lj
0
= a, ljt = ξ
j
t , t ∈ [−δ, 0), uit = ηit, t ∈ [−θ, 0).
The dynamics of Ai with respect to uit for (LLD) is dp
i
t =
[
Atp
i
t + A˜tp
i
t−δ +Btu
i
t + B˜tu
i
t−θ +m
θ
0(t)
]
dt+ σtdW
i
t + σ
0
t dW
0
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
pi0 = a, p
i
t = ξ
i
t, t ∈ [−δ, 0), uit = ηit, t ∈ [−θ, 0).
(25)
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4
sup
1≤i≤N
[
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣lit − pit∣∣2
]
= O
( 1
N
)
, (26)
sup
1≤i≤N
[
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣lit−δ − pit−δ∣∣2
]
= O
( 1
N
)
, (27)
sup
1≤i≤N
[
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣|lit|2 − |pit|2∣∣∣
]
= O
( 1√
N
)
, (28)
sup
1≤i≤N
[
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣|lit−δ |2 − |pit−δ |2∣∣∣
]
= O
( 1√
N
)
, (29)∣∣∣J i(uit, u¯−it )− J i(uit)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (30)
Proof. Using the same analysis to the proof of Lemma 4.2, by (24)-(25) and noting Lemma
4.1, we get (26) and (27). By virtue of (26) and (27), (28) and (29) follows by applying Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality. Same to Lemma 4.3, (30) is obtained. 
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Proof of Theorem 4.1: Now, we consider the ǫ-Nash equilibrium for Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . It
follows from (23) and (30) that
J i(u¯it, u¯−it ) = J i(u¯it) +O
( 1√
N
)
≤ J i(uit) +O
( 1√
N
)
= J i(uit, u¯−it ) +O
( 1√
N
)
.
Thus, Theorem 4.1 follows by taking ǫ = O
(
1√
N
)
.
5 Special cases
In this section, we will study some special cases to show the essence of MFG problem with delay.
Case I: In this case, we will give the “closed-loop” form of the ǫ-Nash equilibrium. For
simplicity, let A˜t = B˜t = 0 in system (1), then we study the following system,
dxit =
[
Atx
i
t +Btu
i
t +
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
B̂tu
j
t−θ
]
dt+ σtdW
i
t + σ
0
t dW
0
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
x0 = a,
(31)
and the cost functional is still (2).
Now, we consider the following FBSDE
dx¯it =
[
Atx¯
i
t −Bt(Nt + N˜t+θ)−1B⊤t y¯it +mθ0(t)
]
dt+ σtdW
i
t + σ
0
t dW
0
t ,
dy¯it = −
[
A⊤t y¯
i
t + (Rt + R˜t+δ)x¯
i
t
]
dt+ z¯itdW
i
t + z¯
0
t dW
0
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
x¯i0 = a,
y¯iT =Mx¯
i
T ,
(32)
In system (32), we could deduce the mθ0(t) as follows,
mθ0(t) = lim
N→∞
B̂t
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
u¯jt−θ
= −B̂t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1B⊤t−θ lim
N→∞
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
y˜it−θ
= −B̂t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1B⊤t−θEF
W0
t−θ [y˜t−θ]
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where y˜t satisfies the following FBSDDE,
dx˜t =
[
Atx˜t −Bt(Nt + N˜t+θ)−1B⊤t y˜t − B̂t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1B⊤t−θEF
W0
t−θ [y˜t−θ]
]
dt+ σtdWt
+ σ0t dW
0
t ,
dy˜t = −
[
A⊤t y˜t + (Rt + R˜t+δ)x˜t
]
dt+ z˜tdWt + z˜
0
t dW
0
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
x˜0 = a,
y˜T =Mx˜T ,
(33)
whereWt andW
i
t are independent and identically distributed. According to the Appendix in [9],
(33) has a unique solution (x˜t, y˜t, z˜t, z˜
0
t ).
Then, FBSDDE (32) could be rewritten as follows
dx¯it =
[
Atx¯
i
t −Bt(Nt + N˜t+θ)−1B⊤t y¯it − B̂t(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1B⊤t−θEF
W0
t−θ [y˜t−θ]
]
dt]dt
+ σtdW
i
t + σ
0
t dW
0
t ,
dy¯it = −
[
A⊤t y¯
i
t + (Rt + R˜t+δ)x¯
i
t
]
dt+ z¯itdW
i
t + z¯
0
t dW
0
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
x¯i0 = a,
y¯iT =Mx¯
i
T .
(34)
FBSDE (34) could be decoupled by the following Riccati equation and ordinary differential
equation {
P˙t + PtAt +A
⊤
t Pt +Rt + R˜t+δ − PtBt(Nt + N˜t+θ)−1B⊤t Pt = 0,
PT =M,
and {
φ˙t + [At −Bt(Nt + N˜t+θ)−1B⊤t Pt]φt − PtBˆt(Nt−θ + N˜t)−1B⊤t−θEF
W0
t−θ [y˜t−θ] = 0,
φT = 0.
We obtain the optimal feedback is
u¯it = −(Nt + N˜t+θ)−1B⊤t (Ptx¯it + φt).
From Theorem 4.1, we claim that (u¯1t , u¯
2
t , · · · , u¯Nt ) is the ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the Problem (31),
(2).
Case II: Now, we consider another special case. Let At = Bt = 0 in system (1), moreover,
we assume δ = θ, then we study the following system
dxit =
[
A˜tx
i
t−δ + B˜tu
i
t−δ +
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
B̂tu
j
t−δ
]
dt+ σtdW
i
t + σ
0
t dW
0
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
xi0 = a, x
i
t = ξ
i
t, t ∈ [−δ, 0), uit = ηit, t ∈ [−θ, 0),
(35)
and the cost functional is
J i(uit, u−it ) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
[
Nt(u
i
t)
2 + N˜t(u
i
t−θ)
2
]
dt+MxiT .
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We will consider the following system instead of (35) dx
i
t =
[
A˜tx
i
t−δ + B˜tu
i
t−δ +m
δ
0(t)
]
dt+ σtdW
i
t + σ
0
t dW
0
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
xi0 = a, x
i
t = ξ
i
t, t ∈ [−δ, 0), uit = ηit, t ∈ [−θ, 0).
(36)
and the adjoint equation is
dyit = −A˜t+δEF
i
t [yit+δ]dt+ z
i
tdW
i
t + z
0
t dW
0
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
yiT = −M,
yit = 0, t ∈ (T, T + (δ ∨ θ)].
(37)
We could solve (37) explicitly by applying the method in [24], which can also be found in [19].
(i) When t ∈ [T − δ, T ], the ABSDE (37) becomes
y¯it = −M −
∫ T
t
z¯isdW
i
t −
∫ T
t
z¯0sdW
0
t , t ∈ [T − δ, T ]
We could solve
y¯t = −M, z¯it = 0, z¯0t = 0, t ∈ [T − δ, T ].
(ii) If we solve (37) on the interval [T − kδ, T − (k − 1)δ](k = 1, 2, 3 · · · ), and the solution
{(y¯it, z¯it , z¯0t );T − kδ ≤ t ≤ T − (k − 1)δ} is Malliavin differentiable, then we could solve the (37)
on the next interval [T − (k + 1)δ, T − kδ],
y¯it = E[y¯T−kδ] +
∫ T−kδ
t
A˜sE
F is [y¯s+δ]ds,
and
z¯it = 0, z¯
0
t = 0, t ∈ [T − (k + 1)δ, T − kδ].
The optimal control is
u¯it = −(Nt + N˜t+δ)−1B˜t+δEF
i
t [y¯t+δ].
So the ǫ-Nash equilibrium is (u¯1t , u¯
2
t , · · · , u¯Nt ).
Next, we consider a special case that the coefficients are all constants: A˜t = A˜, B˜t = B˜,
M = 1, Nt = N , N˜t = N˜ , then the solution of (37) as follows,
y¯it+δ = 0, z¯
i
t = 0, z¯
0
t = 0, t ∈ [T − δ, T ];
y¯it+δ = −1, z¯it = 0, z¯0t = 0, t ∈ [T − 2δ, T − δ];
y¯it+δ = −1− A˜(T − δ − t), z¯it = 0, z¯0t = 0, t ∈ [T − 3δ, T − 2δ];
y¯it+δ = −1− A˜δ − A˜(T − 2δ − t)[1 +
1
2
A˜(T − 2δ − t)], z¯it = 0, z¯0t = 0, t ∈ [T − 4δ, T − 3δ];
· · · · · ·
Then, ǫ-Nash equilibrium is (u¯1t , u¯
2
t , · · · , u¯Nt ), where
u¯it = −
B˜
N + N˜
y¯it+δ.
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